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Constitutionalism in the Age of Populism

Draft Conference Paper

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Prologue

“Un micro pour... un micro contre...”

I remember an experience from my student days, when I was a member of a housing cooperative in Montreal. We were planning a public action, the details of which escape me now. Most of us were students, but one member of our committee was a militant in the union movement. We were discussing a meeting to canvass initiatives and mobilize participants. It was then that the union rep, exasperated with our rather general discussion, laid out how he thought the public meeting should run, how the hall should be organized, and how there should be “un micro pour... un micro contre...”: one microphone for those in favour of the measure, one for those opposed.

I remember being struck at the time at the contrast between our rather abstract and, I confess, a little self-righteous, invocation of the people’s views, and the union rep’s understanding of what would be required to elicit and hear those views. It was a lesson that has never left me. Democratic action – true democratic action, where the views of flesh-and-blood people actually matter – is a function, ultimately, of the quality of our procedures and of our practices within those procedures.

That lesson is germane to the challenges of constitutionalism in a populist age.

I. Introduction

Populism is a notoriously open term, with different commentators fastening upon very different features to describe the essence of the concept. In the press and in popular debate, it sometimes seems to be little more than an epithet hurled at whatever the commentator considers to be improper conduct by politicians acting in the name of the people. Even in the specialist literature, the range of phenomena captured within the term is astounding. It is, as we will see, a quintessentially contested concept.¹

It also exists in deeply contested relationship with democratic theory. “Populism” is overwhelmingly invoked today with a negative valence: it singles out conduct or individuals for criticism. But its use is, at least at times, driven by discomfort with democracy itself. It is sometimes deployed, as the language of “mob rule” or “demagoguery” have in the past, to attack decisions that have been arrived at by straightforward democratic means: appeals for popular support; deliberation; and majority votes. Moreover, one might well argue that, if democracy is fundamentally about popular self-rule, democracy has to be, to some extent, warts and all. Otherwise, in what sense are flesh-and-blood citizens, with their particular commitments and aspirations, being permitted to rule themselves? Are they only allowed to do so when we, the assessors, think they’ve made an acceptable decision? And, if that supercilious stance is what criticisms of populism come down to, aren’t the people right to rebel?

¹ [Gallie].

The debate over populism, in short, forces us to think harder about the meaning of popular self-rule, democratic practice, and the constitutional structures that organize and constrain that practice. The debate necessarily brings us back to constitutionalism, with that term considered in its broadest sense: not just the legal rules that confine government action, but also the institutional arrangements and ethical practices that establish government, give government its form, subject it to popular decision-making, characterize the nature and processes of that decision-making, and indeed define the people (or peoples) themselves. The debate over populism is intrinsically connected, then, to debates over other essentially contested concepts, notably democracy, citizenship, peoplehood, and the rule of law.

The Victoria conference is designed to explore these issues and, if possible, to clarify them. This discussion paper seeks to begin that process by canvassing various ways in which populism is used, identifying elements that are common in uses of the term; identifying others that are often invoked but that appear to be less universal in their invocation (elements, that is, where the relationship to populism is more one of affinity or propensity than centrality); and attempting to show how those elements are interrelated. This discussion paper is not intended to define populism. That is not what one does with essentially contested concepts. But it does seek to sketch the contours that emerge from the deployment of populism's various elements – or, to mix metaphors, to explore the discursive ecosystem that populism helps to determine. The paper was itself developed discursively, first by a call for input to a group of faculty and graduate students engaged in the Cedar Trees Institute, and then workshopped among a group of some twenty faculty and grad students on 2 March 2020.

To be clear, the purpose of this paper is not primarily descriptive. It is undertaken in order to clarify what is at stake in populism for normative political and legal theory – or, better, not for theory but for practice: How should we conduct ourselves as democratic citizens? How should we conceive of the dimensions of our people? What are the appropriate constitutional foundations for democratic self-rule?

II. Essentially Contested Concepts

If there ever were an essentially contested concept, it would be populism. The notion of an essentially contested concept has been applied prominently to populism in recent debates.²

The term was coined about 65 years ago by WB Gallie to understand the role of concepts that are central to our deliberation about particular achievements, but where those achievements are internally complex, where the elements that go into evaluating the achievement are open to perennial debate, and where the intensity of the debate, sustained in time, is itself fruitful for the better realization of the achievement.³ Gallie's four principal examples of such terms are art, democracy, social justice, and what it means to adhere to a religion. Such concepts are, he argues, incapable of stable and agreed definition. They epitomize Wittgenstein's insight that definitions typically are analogous to family resemblances (as Jim Tully suggested), in which our various uses of terms draw upon a range of features that intersect in practice, but where no single set of features is shared by all uses. Wittgenstein understood family resemblances to be characteristic of all definitions; in his view, we draw upon the overlapping features in our ordinary use of language, generally without controversy. Gallie's essentially contested concepts form a subset of terms understood in that way. For this class of terms, controversy is central. The terms are actively and vigorously argued over in their ordinary use. That contestation accounts in substantial

² Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017.

³ This description is, I believe, substantially the same as Gallie's list of seven elements: [].

measure for their value. Those employing the concepts seek to express aspirations that are immensely important but that are complex and elusive in their conception, structure, requirements, and realization. The worrying over the terms – the continual arguments over them – drives our understanding of the complex phenomena they strive to explicate and affirm. In a very real sense, the terms' vitality, their fruitfulness, resides in their ability to hold our attention and spur our attempts to make sense of them. Iris Murdoch, in *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, speaks of the role of irresolvable difficulties (of many kinds) in stimulating moral reflection.

At the border-lines of thought and language we can often 'see' what we cannot say: and we have to *wait* and attempt to formulate for ourselves and convey to others our *experience* of what is initially beyond and hidden. We look out into the abyss, into the mystery, intuiting what is not ourselves. A difficulty is a light, an insuperable difficulty is a sun.⁴

"Waiting", it seems to me, also takes the form of attending to the assertions made regarding these complex terms and observing the actions the arguments prompt in the world.

Nevertheless, the fact that these concepts are essentially contested does not mean that they are immune from analysis or clarification. The concepts are fruitful precisely because they focus our attention on phenomena that are important in evaluative, in directive, terms. Thus, "democracy" is fruitful not simply because those using the term disagree, but because their strenuous attempts to give meaning to the idea of citizens governing themselves address a conundrum of foundational importance to our political life. The perennial arguments about how to understand and operationalize the aspiration are valuable precisely because they illuminate what the aspiration might mean. They draw us deep into conceptions of peoplehood, deliberation, consent, solidarity, self-rule, authority, legitimacy (the list could go on). Because of the utility of such a concept, it is worth probing its meaning, identifying its central questions, and reflecting upon its entailments and affinities. Doing so may help us to maximize its fruitfulness by sharpening the questions upon which it draws. That is the purpose of this paper.

Given that this process of clarification is in aid of normative rather than descriptive reflection, it is worth outlining briefly some of the commitments that will shape this paper.

First, this paper seeks to identify what *distinctive* insights might be obtained through an engagement with populism. If we are to use the term to organize our reflections, its use should not simply duplicate work that other concepts do just as well or better. For example, some criticisms of populism appear to be nothing more than criticisms of right-wing authoritarianism. If that is all that is relevant to populism, we might just as well stick with the primary concept. That said, it may be that populism's utility as a concept arises from the connections it identifies between phenomena that are often discussed independently. Its significance may lie, then, in the insights it can bring to the interrelationships between established concepts.

Second, this paper steers away from interpretations of populism that treat it as though it were characterized by a profound rejection of, a profound alienation from, democratic self-government – that consider it to be simply anti-democratic. As we will see, a measure of disenchantment is common to populisms. It is possible that the disenchantment is absolute in some movements that are called populist. (Might this be true, for example, of the Bolsonaro regime – or is the Bolsonaro regime deserving of the name "populist"?) But it is also clear that populist disenchantment can still be – perhaps generally is – democratic in its essential aspirations: it is driven by the perception that our institutions are not *sufficiently* democratic; that they are not consistent with a worthwhile conception of

⁴ Murdoch, 283.

self-rule. It is that latter form of populism that is the focus here. Attending to that form of populism may help us clarify what we ought to mean by democracy and be more specific about what conduces to a healthy democratic order.

Concentrating on that plausibly democratic form of populism is especially appropriate to this conference's distinctive concern with constitutionalism. Constitutional norms – norms that regulate the interrelationship among institutions, that specify the form of those institutions, and that shape our conduct within those institutions – are a principal battleground for populism and anti-populism. The claims made by plausibly democratic forms of populism are acutely relevant to the understanding and institutionalization of popular government.

III. The Content of the Essentially Contested Concept of Populism

This initial understanding of populism therefore sees it as addressing a subset of the questions associated with the essentially contested concept of democracy – or, to be more precise, of popular sovereignty, because although populism grounds political agency in the people, it may challenge the procedural apparatus that one often associates with democracy. There have been populist autocracies, indeed many in the current environment would say that there is a distressing affinity between populism and autocratic tendencies.

Moreover, its relationship to democracy is of a particular kind: it is concerned with assessing the adequacy of one's democratic practice against a (contested) ideal of popular sovereignty:⁵ populists find the past practice wanting and seek to renovate it; anti-populists consider that the populists are driving democracy down a negative path. This critical stance can be adopted by people occupying very different ideologies. Hence the much remarked-upon fact that populists can occupy radically different sections of the ideological spectrum. Populism is, as many have remarked, ideologically "thin".

This ideological thinness suggests that the commonality among populisms lies primarily in populists' way of doing democratic politics rather than their policy aims. Populism is, above all, a strategy of political engagement. In teasing out the distinctive characteristics of that strategy, this paper will often check its hypotheses by considering "left populism". All commentators agree that most contemporary populisms are on the right of the political spectrum. But the fact that the term is also applied to some movements on the left helps us to distinguish populism's distinctive way of doing politics from the thicker ideological commitments that movements pursue. That said, it is necessary never to forget that populism remains a contested concept, applied to a wide variety of movements, not always consistently. Moreover, its complexity – the fact that populism's distinctive character may lie as much in the interactions among criteria as in the existence of defined list of criteria – means that it can present very differently in different contexts. The collective that contributed to this paper found that we were constantly comparing populisms in different countries, wondering whether we were in fact observing similar phenomena. I suspect the same will happen at the conference.

This paper will also pay some attention to historical populist movements, especially those in the United States around which the term was coined. Gallie emphasizes that essentially contested concepts are elaborated within a tradition of inquiry, a tradition characterized by their preoccupation with the meaning that ought to be attached to the concepts at their heart – in his examples art, democracy,

⁵ This, in the case of populism, is the shared focus, the participation in a common activity, that Gallie identifies as being important to the deployment of an "essentially contested concept" (178).

social justice, and religion.⁶ That seems right. In our case, there is a reason why the term populism, coined in the late 19th-century United States, is now applied to the movements we see today. The similarities in those phenomena, and their linking in political discourse over such a long time-span, help us see populism's distinctive characteristics.

As will become clear, this analysis suggests that populisms, in the sense explored here, are not reducible to one feature but are marked by the interaction of several features. These features can, this paper suggests, be usefully sorted into two categories: 1) core elements – elements that are present in virtually all movements to which the term populism is applied and the interaction of which appears to be an animating feature what is said to be their populism; 2) elements that are linked by affinity or propensity to the core interaction – that are therefore frequently found in populist movements, that may even be considered typical of populist movements, but that are not present in all such movements. These two categories will be one helpful step (but only one) towards achieving the aspiration set out above, namely to sketch the contours that emerge from the interaction of populism's various elements – or, again mixing metaphors, to explore the discursive ecosystem that populism helps to determine.

In making this distinction, I do not mean at all to suggest that category 1 is more important than category 2 to the understanding of and the normative insights that can be derived from an engagement with populism. For one thing, some commentators clearly consider that very significant features of populism are items in this paper's category 2. Indeed, some may believe that one should promote certain items in category 2 to category 1 – an appropriate response to engagement with an essentially contested concept! Moreover, it may be that the propensities identified, even if not universal, are sufficiently likely to occur and sufficiently damaging when they do occur that they justify deep concern with elements at the core. That may lead one to argue that we should work against those aspects of the core or, at the very least, strive to guard against their pathologies. Finally, as we will see, some of the propensities may provide clues to how we might respond most effectively to populisms. Propensities matter.

A. Core Elements:

There are, I think, four elements the interaction of which characterizes populism.

1. The Claim to Speak for the People

The first and most obvious is populists' claim to speak on behalf of the people. That claim, almost inevitably, involves the projection, explicitly or implicitly, of a specific definition of who constitutes the people. One can imagine that the definition need not be an exclusionary one – at least, so Chantal Mouffe so claims.⁷ But it very often is, on the left and on the right.

The one sense in which it may not be exclusionary is when it simply emphasizes the democratic foundations of authority: that decisions of government must depend upon a popular mandate, where government is accountable to the body of citizens, and where means exist by which the aggregate of citizens can change their determinations. It seems to me that such a claim, to have any reality, must rely

⁶ Gallie's sixth condition is more demanding than the statement in the text: "the derivation of any such concept [an essentially contested concept] from an original exemplar whose authority is acknowledged by all the contestant users of the concept" (180).

⁷ Chantal Mouffe, *For a Left Populism* (London: Verso, 2018)

on the quality of the process of democratic engagement. It must rely upon the concrete mechanisms by which the public-at-large are able to shape their governance, with essentially all those subject to the authority enfranchised and where there are defensible mechanisms by which the citizens' views are aggregated to produce the outcomes. Even the defensibility of those mechanisms must rely on process values. They cannot be determined by theoretical fiat, but by recursive processes of debate and reform that engage the people themselves, so that the very defensibility of the mechanisms is anchored within processes of deliberation and decision: "un micro pour... un micro contre..." It is only through such procedures that the claim that the whole people have had a role in the decision attains some plausibility. But, it must be said, such a proceduralist picture does not sound very populist.

Instead, populists typically claim that the substantive positions for which they stand are the people's will. Such a forceful claim to speak in the voice of the people necessarily involves some measure of exclusion: the speaker's rivals emphatically do not possess the people's voice. The part speaks for the whole – with the part perhaps being a majority, although even that is unlikely given the contentious means by which even populist parties adopt policy positions – to say nothing of the fact that populists typically claim to possess the people's true voice even when in opposition. That claim to be the privileged voice of the people is why several commentators say that populism is inherently anti-pluralist.⁸ It tends towards a winner-take-all approach to political competition, where a majority owes no respect to the losers of an election or a vote, who are discredited by the very act of losing.⁹

Moreover, such an approach has a tendency to be schismatic and narrowing. Its emphasis on the singleness of the people's voice typically has little tolerance for dissent, including dissent within the governing party. It claims to distinguish the true people from the pretenders, the loyal from the less than loyal, the patriots from the traitors.

In addition to the exclusion that occurs between those who speak for and those who speak against the people, there is also frequently a narrowing of the definition of the people on identity grounds. The emphasis, in many populisms, upon a united people speaking as one frequently presupposes a unity that is not merely ideological. Carl Schmitt, in his emphasis upon a distinction between friends and enemies as the essence of all true politics, was clear that friends and enemies were always "concrete human groupings which fight other concrete human groupings in the name of justice, humanity, order, or peace." That has a practical logic, even if it might not seem strictly necessary. Indeed, when one looks at populisms, they often do make appeals that refer to ascriptive identities: Orbán's anti-Semitic dog-whistling; the PiS's nostalgic Catholicism; Modi's Hindu communalism; Trump's softness towards neo-Nazis; UKIP's (and then the Brexit party's) exaltation of Britain in the war. Is the same true of contemporary left populisms? That is less clear, but what is clear is that their forerunners, the anti-monopolists and populists of the 19th century, certainly tended to be narrow in their views of who counted: they were strongly against Asian immigration and, although there were instances of alliances between white populists and African Americans, the former generally tended to exclude the latter. Even populists of the left appeal, above all, to their people. If their people are racist, they are likely to mould those appeals to that audience (although there have been exceptions).

One way in which populism has strong exclusionary tendencies across both left and right is in relation to immigration. The extent to which immigration dominates contemporary populist agendas is remarkable. It is not accidental. Populism affirms, above all, popular sovereignty. That requires at least an implicit

⁸ Jan-Werner Müller, *What is Populism?* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2016); *Handbook*; Galston.

⁹ Sadurski (3).

conception of the people. It is that people who are engaging in self-rule. It gets to determine what its governments do. Governments must, in the last analysis, act in that specific people's interests. Such a stance doesn't necessarily preclude generosity towards outsiders but it often does. It certainly treats them as outsiders. In the case of conflict, the people's interests prevail.

Moreover, this stark division of insiders and outsiders, inherent in the overwhelming emphasis on self-rule by a specific, physical people, also means that populists tend to be highly resistant to participation, commentary, or criticism – above all criticism – from those outside the people. Outsiders have no entitlement to tell the people how to behave.

Now you, insightful reader, will already have seen that much of what has been said is characteristic of, or at least has its roots in, features that are typical of democracy generally. Democracy too places heavy demands on the definition of the people and of citizenship: it needs to have some working conception of who are the bearers of political agency – if nothing else, who gets to vote. Democracy's strong emphasis on equality of participation frequently extends to equality of treatment of all citizens, and the simplest and most accessible understanding of equality is sameness. That tendency towards sameness of treatment is paired, too frequently, with an acute impatience with people who insist on being different, especially if that difference would need to be reflected in public policy. It is worth remembering that, during the colonial period in settler societies, the governments that were worst in their approach to the Indigenous land question were democratic reformers (populists *avant la lettre*?); the Tories and the imperial authorities tended to be much more willing to countenance Indigenous title and institutions. We on the left tend to presume that all progressive causes must proceed in lockstep, but there is no doubt that some causes that are deeply cherished are in tension with others, a tension that needs careful resolution. That is certainly true of democracy and differentiation.

I should also make clear that, while recognizing their rhetorical force, we should not take the claims to equality as sameness simply at face value. An important question is "Sameness to who?" That question brings us back to who constitutes the people to whom populists ascribe political agency. That "people" is generally a subset of the people. Think, for example, of the often highly gendered quality of populists' understanding of the people's voice.

This, I think, points to an important truth about populism. It is not simply a departure from democracy. It is an accentuation of challenges that are baked into democratic self-government. That doesn't mean that we should cease to be democrats. It does mean that we should think carefully about *how* we should be democrats.

2. Anti-Elitism

Another core quality of populism is its suspicion of, and opposition to, elites. Indeed, populists commonly champion self-rule by the people in express opposition to rule by "corrupt elites". This opposition has many facets. It certainly rejects claims, or perceived claims, by individuals or groups to differential political voice. It is also very common for populists to be skeptical of assertions of professional expertise, scientific knowledge, or education generally – think of Trump's championing of the "uneducated", the Hungarian regime's redirection of education funding to institutions more directly under government control, or the Modi regime's replacement of academic administrators with officers who are tools of his government. This can coincide with a non-rationalist and expressivist conception of truth, in which what counts is the people's holding of a belief (as János Mécs suggested in his input). Moreover, the criticism of elites can also have a cultural dimension, expressed in an ordinary-Joe style of

dress (Trump's MAGA caps), in the language of the common people, in the tropes of the people's supposed religion, in blunt talking, in criticisms of political correctness.

These features are clearly connected to populism's emphasis on democratic egalitarianism. Whether we like it or not, each of those features underpins inequality of influence in fact. Moreover, the populists' suspicions are shaped by the realization that expressions of professional opinions, even well-grounded expert knowledge, are not perfectly disconnected from interest. We may struggle for – we ought strenuously to fight for – impartiality and self-critical discipline in our professional and expert analyses, but that is a struggle against dispositions of which we may not always be sufficiently aware, as the sociologists of knowledge would certainly tell us. Impartiality and self-criticism are virtues that are immensely valuable. They should be affirmed against populist criticism even if their achievement is always imperfect. But that imperfection is clearly one of the mainsprings of populist politics.

That anti-elitism also has a dignitarian dimension to it. Many have commented on the role of inequality of dignity in populist appeals. There is a strong sense among those susceptible to populist appeals of one's voice not counting, of being disrespected, of historical grievance, of being victimized. It is important to realize that that sense is not just a matter of feelings. The sentiment is allied to a more concrete perception that government is tone-deaf, that it is not listening or acting upon one's primary concerns, that government has become too responsive to some people's demands and not at all responsive to others. Again, this attitude crosses left and right populisms.

We should not leave this topic without recognizing a common irony in populist political movements. They may be anti-elitist in their origins, but, if successful, they become the elite. They frequently end up provoking criticisms not dramatically different from those they themselves used. Think of the examples cited above regarding the Hungarian and Indian governments' intervention in higher education. That is as much the use of governmental power to bolster one's own interest as were the practices they were opposing. Indeed, it is sometimes much more directly so, given their delegitimation of aspirations to impartiality. Populist governments typically reward their friends, adding more ooze to the swamp that they once made a point of criticizing. They certainly need to make choices as to the policies to pursue and in doing so rely on processes of decision-making that are shaped by exercises of authority. Robert Michels' iron law of oligarchy often appears to be at work. It sometimes seems that the populist discourse – posing the people against the elites – is self-liquidating.

This irony emphasizes once again that the challenges of populism are the challenges of democracy: how to achieve real popular participation and translate that participation into particular decisions, even though decisions can never be a matter of unanimous agreement; how to act in the name of the people in a manner that is legitimate, even though it is only in the most blessed of circumstances that governments can speak for anything like a unanimous people.

3. Binary, Moralizing, All-or-Nothing Appeals

Another feature that appears to be typical of all populist movements is the moralizing quality of their discourse. Many commentators note that a populist politics tends to be binary, posing the people (good) against the elites (bad). The difference is not merely a difference of opinion; it is a contrast between rectitude and corruption. Thus, populism also eschews consensus and compromise. Why should one compromise with the enemies of the people? As János Mécs phrased this idea, "the moralistic imagination contradicts the very essence of liberal-constitutional representation that treats different political forces neutrally. The inherent inferior-superior quality of the different political forces

presupposes some a priori 'right' answer that represents anti-pluralism and contradicts the very essence of free political competition”

This follows from populism’s claim to possess the voice of the people. It is tough to see how a politics of compromise and consensus-building can survive the assertion of unanimity vested in the very people whom democracy claims to represent. Thus, the Manichean quality of a populist politics undermines any respect for pluralistic mechanisms for government decision-making. If the people’s voice is axiomatically taken to be single, then institutions premised upon the expression of diverse points of view and their aggregation are profoundly misconceived – essentially heretical. Instead of expressing the one true way in simple and direct terms, they blur and complicate. Carl Schmitt expressed this disenchantment with pluralistic democracy well: parliaments replace the true voice of the people with a mechanically derived aggregation which, in the end, represents no-one’s true voice. As Ryan Beaton said in his response to the call for input, the antagonistic element of populist politics is therefore intrinsically tied to the next core feature: the distrust of procedures and institutions.

4. Distrust for Procedures and Institutions

The last of the four core elements of populist movements is a marked impatience, an acute distrust, for the existing institutions of government, including parliamentary procedure, hearings, debate, elections that are about deliberation rather than simple affirmation, the rule of law, the separation of powers, the procedures of courts (one could go on). These are all seen as little more than obstacles to action. They create opportunities – perhaps even design opportunities – through which those who oppose can frustrate the people’s will.

Indeed, Wojciech Sadurski considers the dismantling of institutions to be what is most distinctive about populism. He objects to treating populism as simply a matter of discourse. He suggests (with some justification) that many of the purely discursive elements of populism are common in democratic rhetoric generally. For him, populism’s distinctive feature is that it actively seeks to eliminate or neutralize the intermediate institutions between the people and the state. Ryan Beaton, in his feedback, notes that that dismantling can occur “relative to particular issues (immigration, economic inequality, climate crises, etc) or relative to a particular message/ideology/value system (nationalism, nativism, ecologism, etc) or relative to the relationship between leader and supporters or the charisma of a leader, or typically some combination of these three. The greater emphasis placed on particular issues, ideology/message, and personal connection, are taken to justify bending or breaking established institutional norms.” Zoltán Pozsár-Szentmiklósy adds in his input: “It is quite controversial that while populism claims the 'true representation' of people (and, in that regard, a more perfect realization of people's sovereignty), in reality, populist politics weakens the structures and procedures which support the inclusion of people in politics and public affairs (eg. by weakening the 'free' nature of elections as there are no deliberative debates in campaigns).”

There is, I think, an important distinction lurking here. One aspect captures populism’s impatience with and attempt to deconstruct the institutional constraints on government: what might be called the populist wrecking-ball. (I should be clear, however, that in speaking of constraints I am consciously reflecting the populists’ own terminology. In my view it is a mistake to treat institutions as being merely, or even predominantly, about constraints on government. They are, at their best, enablers of collective self-government, fostering the formulation and expression of a collective position.) A second aspect, however, is grounded in the fact that populist politics derives much of its force from genuine dissatisfaction with the operation of institutions – from, in other words, motivated criticisms of how

those institutions operate and the interests they serve. There is no doubt, for example, that much contemporary left populism in Europe is driven by the decisions of the European institutions during the debt crisis, and that those decisions led to a genuine collapse of support for those institutions' processes. Similarly, in the 19th century United States, the anti-monopoly and populist movements were shaped by the perception – not unreasonable – that governments were acting in collusion with railroads and other industries to siphon public resources into private hands. It would be a great mistake, then, to judge the hostility of populists to existing institutions as though populism were simply about the de-institutionalization of government. Some populists clearly do chafe at all institutional constraints, but many engage in credible and deeply-held criticisms that need to be heard, weighed, and their implications considered.

That said, the situation is complicated by the fact that, in populist politics, the bona fide criticisms are sometimes bound tightly together with some of their members' root-and-branch hostility to all institutional constraints. Populist leaders may invoke the first in service of the second. Not only that, but some are manifestly ready to *increase* the dysfunctionality of institutions precisely in order to blow them up. That is a central dimension of the Donald Trump/Steve Bannon/William Barr strategy. They calculate that any loss of trust in institutions, any acute frustration with their operation, even if induced by their own actions, will redound to their benefit because it will remove those vehicles for contestation from the field.¹⁰ That is a high-risk strategy. We have yet to see whether it will succeed. But one can see the logic of the calculation. Even when there is no such conscious strategy, disaffection from established institutions can abet a populist political project. Sadurski notes that the current Polish government benefits from the public's distrust and disengagement from *all* political parties. If that is true, it is an ironic achievement for a movement that claims to act in the name of the people.

5. Populism as itself Manipulative, Duplicitous, and Corrupt

Wait! There were only to be four core elements. What is this fifth?

This feature is often advanced in criticisms of populist movements – so often that it might be thought to be essential to our understanding of the phenomenon. Moreover, it is depressingly characteristic of many contemporary populist movements. It just made a cameo appearance in my invocation of the Trump/Bannon/Barr strategy. Should it be considered one of populism's core elements?

I think not. The reason is not to deny that the practice of saying one thing but then doing another is characteristic of contemporary populisms. Certainly for populisms on the right of the political spectrum, that practice appears to be very common indeed. Does anyone really believe that Trump in the United States, or Orbán in Hungary, isn't using public resources to build up private wealth? I suspect that many of their most ardent supporters believe that they are, but the supporters' distrust of institutions (or, for the leading supporters, their cynicism) is sufficiently entrenched that they are content simply that their guy now has the upper hand.

It may even be that populist movements are particularly prone to this form of disenchantment. Populism is not necessarily defined by any particular policy commitments. Populist movements often do

¹⁰ There is an interesting parallel from 1888. At that time of notoriously corrupt government, Eugene V Debs tried to maximize the impact of the various railway unions by securing their centralized coordination, but he was opposed on the grounds that such a structure would be "a broad opening for bribery and treachery" by government and industry. White at 416, quoting Salvatore, Debs, at 93.

not subscribe to any well-developed *projet de société* (to adopt the French phrase that captures not just the visionary but also the practical dimension of ideology) – or at least they need not do so. Their principal positive claim is simply that they speak on behalf of the people. The very thinness of their ideology, the very emptiness of their invocation of the “people”, and their very absence of respect for institutional form or practices, open considerable space for shenanigans.

But I question the normative utility of such an element. First, it doesn’t appear to be inherent in populism. The distinctive rhetorical and de-institutionalizing strategies of populism – the elements that make the movements recognizably populist – can be pursued in the service of particular ideologies even without dissembling. Moreover, a politics of manipulation, a politics of duplicity, is hardly unique to populism.

Above all, such a criticism runs an acute risk of being condescending towards the audience for populist appeals – condescending in a way that involves a further denial of voice to those who may feel, justifiably, that they are excluded from politics. It may treat them as ... well, “deplorables”. Kwame Anthony Appiah criticizes meritocracy for its tendency to smugness, and notes how it can call forth “resentment toward a class defined by its education and its values: the cosmopolitan, degree-laden people who dominate the media, the public culture, and the professions in the US.” Because of this condescension, we can fail to listen to what our compatriots are saying. We can fail to attend to what underpins their dissatisfaction. We can fail to learn from what they think about our society’s institutions. The response of anti-populists can be, ironically, just as exclusionary as populist politics. Indeed, at the limit, it can fall prey to a supercilious anti-democracy.

B. Propensities and Affinities:

Already, several such propensities and affinities have been noted in the discussion of the core elements. It is necessary now only to list those features – features that are not universally present in populisms but that are very commonly so:

1. A Tendency towards a Narrow and Exclusive Definition of the People
2. A Tendency to Build the Definition of the People around Ascriptive Characteristics, including a potential for Racism, Religious Intolerance, the Rejection of Cultural Diversity, a Highly-Gendered Approach to Social Interaction, and the Like
3. Opposition to Immigration
4. Skepticism with respect to Professional Expertise, Scientific Knowledge, and Education Generally
5. A Sense of Wounded Dignity, Victimhood, Disrespect, or Vulnerability
6. The Fact that Populist Appeals are sometimes Manipulative and Duplicious

Other propensities have been foreshadowed by the previous discussion:

7. A Close Connection to Nationalist Politics

The affinity to nationalism follows from populism’s strong emphasis upon expressing the will of the people – almost by definition, then, a specific people, who are bearers of the right of self-government and to whom the government is accountable. It is possible that the relevant people(s) might be conceived in plural or compound form, so that one could conceive of populism as applying simultaneously to multiple levels of “peoples” in the same way that nationality might be conceived in

compound form, comprising: a) a component people of a multinational nation; b) the multinational nation itself; c) supranational or international forums for political engagement and decision. Even in the absence of compound membership, the members of one people might respect the attachment of other peoples to their nationality and, in some manner, find common cause in that relationship to their separate countries. But such an open and inclusive conception of political engagement is rare among populisms. Instead, they have a tendency to narrowness precisely because of the unity of voice so commonly presumed in populism. “Make America Great Again” is the rule. Indeed the Americans who count are often defined in limited terms.

8. Illiberality

Some commentators have also emphasized that populism is illiberal. This is true of Sadurski, for example, who says, when insisting on the value of the term populism: “We need a language to distinguish between, on the one hand, authoritarianisms that rule by resorting to bare force ... and, on the other hand, illiberal regimes that want to be liked or even loved, at least by a significant segment of the electorate.”

We have certainly seen some elements that tend towards the illiberal: the narrowing of the definition of the people, especially when that definition relies upon racialized, religious, cultural, or gendered exclusions; the presumption that the people speak with one voice; the dismantling of institutions (the form of illiberality that Sadurski emphasizes). The illiberality is often tempered or targeted, however, especially in left populisms. Sadurski himself notes right populism’s attempt to cultivate popular support rather than rely heavily on coercion. Moreover, it is quite common for right populism to be strongly committed to protecting the private accumulation of wealth, although that accumulation is not necessarily entrusted to market mechanisms. For its part, left populism can be (but isn’t always) radically democratic. Populisms of both right and left are, however, almost always resistant to the adjudication of constitutional rights, treating rights enforcement as a constraint on popular self-government.

9. Executive-dominated Government

Populism’s tendency to consider the people’s voice to be singular and united can also coincide with a marked preference for the executive as the dominant branch of government. The fact that the presidency is often the only office for which all people vote, the singularity of the president’s voice in comparison to the multiplicity and division among members of the legislature, and the capacity of a president to take immediate and hard-edged decisions without a complicated process of debate and approval, all combine to make it, in most populisms, the privileged bearer of the people’s voice. Democracy is often conceived in plebiscitary form, with the unattainable ideal being the whole people coming together to choose their leader. It is no accident that Carl Schmitt, the constitutional champion of the executive, has appeared repeatedly in this account.

There are, finally, certain propensities that have not been foreshadowed above:

10. Economic Grievance

There would appear to be no necessary reason why economic grievances should bulk so large in populist politics, but very frequently they do. The contemporary rise of populist parties of both right and left is often attributed to economic insecurity due to the rise of neo-liberalism and the consequent growth of

inequality; the erosion of decently-paying jobs for those in the lower half of the income distribution and the concentration of wealth at the very top of the income distribution; the decline of rural economies; the handling of the financial crisis in the United States in which financial institutions were protected but homeowners and small businesses were not (remember the Tea Party: “Main Street against Wall Street”); the changes wrought by international trade and investment; European institutions’ response to the banking crisis; generally the perception that the economic order is stacked in favour of some players and against others. The same was true of historical populist movements, which were founded to pursue agrarian and working-class interests against finance capital and the latter’s allies in government.

It is also notable that the economic policies pursued by populist governments, of both right and left, tend to emphasize the taking of forceful government action, not the unfettered operation of liberalized markets. That is not to say that right populist governments generally redress the economic balance. They do not (indeed it is notable how often inequality – and, indeed, the wealth of their friends – increases during the period of their rule). But they certainly talk that line. They blame internationalized markets for economic inequality within the country. They paint government actions as part of the problem rather than the solution, using their anti-institutionalism to challenge any sense that governments – at least non-populist governments – have done or will do anything effective to improve the situation. Indeed, they often further reduce government’s ability to act by attacking taxes as part of the problem.

Economic grievances, then, are much more prominent in populist politics than the thin ideology of populism’s distinctive form, or much of the anti-populist literature, would suggest. What accounts for that disjuncture? We will return to that question below.

11. The Rural/Urban Divide

Finally, it is remarkable how often populist politics is strongest in the countryside, certainly on the right but also historically on the left. Those rural foundations account, I think, for many of the distinctive features of populism.

The perception of there being economic winners and losers, and of there being a correlation between government policy and those who win and who lose, is of course strongly pronounced in the countryside, which no longer appears to be in any sense the economic dynamo of the nation. That driving force is now most evident in the country’s internationally-embedded cities. At the same time, rural citizens have often been attached to the ideal of an economy based on family-owned farms; they are not very attracted to the programs of parties squarely on the left. Culturally and demographically, the rural areas tend to be more uniform and more conservative in their vision of society. The appeal to the will of a united people, a people characterized by familiar racial, cultural, and religious elements, often has considerable appeal. They, the citizens of the towns, villages, and farming communities, are the true guardians of the national character, not the cosmopolitan elites of the cities. They are not particularly happy if they perceive that they are the objects of urban condescension. Thus, both economically and culturally, citizens in rural regions are disproportionately disposed to populist appeals.

IV. Ways Forward

That concludes, then, my canvass of the domain of populist discourse. What are the implications for our practice of democratic constitutionalism? To being, as we have seen at many points, the challenges of populism are challenges of democracy itself.

Democracy is about the government that we establish for ourselves. That fact alone presupposes an answer, at least implicit, to who is that “we”. The most inclusive answers extend membership to all residents of a territory, or at least to all who have a measure of permanent attachment to the territory. But even if such a definition is adopted, in any particular decision some will prevail and some will not. What is the status of those who don’t? Is their voice still the voice of the people or are they now the people’s opponents? Populist movements tend towards the latter view.

Moreover, in democracy, the very determination of the people’s voice is the product of a complex mechanism, one in which, at each point, choices are made as to who participates, through what avenues, with what scope for deliberation and what standards of assent. Those processes can seem artificial. They *are* artificial, for they always seek to come to a conclusion in the face of what is continued disagreement. Populism throws that artificiality into relief. It claims to be the people’s voice unmediated, unconstructed. Of course, any collective position, even the populist position, is constructed. Trump was elected with less than a plurality, let alone a majority, of votes. Yet even when a government has majority support, that support is itself the product of electoral roles, constituencies, electoral funding, access to media, thresholds of victory (50 percent? more?), and so on. Even a populist party’s internal position is the result of a complex process of policy formation. Populism makes hard claims to authenticity of voice, but it does so in the face of the real-world complexities of collective decision-making.

Nevertheless, populists seek to capitalize on the citizenry’s frustration with such mechanisms. They commonly do so in four ways. First, they purport to appeal directly to the people, by-passing mechanisms and institutional structures. Second, they seek to blow up or subvert those structures. It is much easier to claim the people’s voice if rival claimants have been silenced. Third, they seek to establish their credentials on substantive rather than procedural grounds. They claim to be the true representatives of the people because they are of the right ethnicity, of the right religion, they are home-grown, they hold the right values, they defend the true people from intrusion and outside criticism. (This, I think, is the most difficult challenge of democratic government. People are attracted to public life because they wish achieve substantive goals – or at least that is true of those whom we would hope would enter public life. Yet the practice of democracy requires that one engage in the hard work of marshalling support through institutional means. How does one prevent a preoccupation with mechanism from swallowing the aspiration to substantive change?) Fourth, any sophisticated populist realizes that mechanisms are indispensable and indeed useful. They therefore use them, cynically, to prevent democratic change once their leadership has been secured. Hence the constitutional manoeuvres that we have seen adopted in Hungary and Poland in recent years: the subjection of electoral procedures to government control; the imposition of constraints on the press and non-governmental organizations; the entrenchment of the government’s initiatives in constitutional form; the packing of courts.

Populists also seek to capitalize on another conundrum of democratic politics: democracy is based on a principle of equality of voice and yet political voice can never be entirely equal. It can be equal in the formal terms of the right to vote – and, for reasons I’ll express in a moment, the maintenance of that formal equality matters greatly – but in practice the impact of citizens’ voices will be shaped by citizens’ articulacy and cogency (therefore often by their education), by their access to resources to project their voice, by their status in society, by their facility in the national language, by their gender, their religion, the colour of their skin, or simply by whether sufficient other citizens agree with them. Populists harness citizens’ perceptions of inequality of influence – or, frequently, their anxiety that they may be losing

influence because of the rise of people who are not like them – and mobilize those perceptions in the service of their political project.

How then should we respond?

To my mind, the discussion in this paper points in the following four directions (which I look forward to us debating and expanding in discussion).

First, it should drive us to think more carefully about what kind of “people”, what kind of “nation”, we wish to have.

A centrally defining feature of populist movements is that they claim to act in the name of a people, but peoples are never just given. They are always made. We need to ask what kind of people our political appeals are creating. As we have seen, populisms often seek to erect sharp divides between the true people and their ostensible opponents on the basis of support for the populist party. The people are those who are faithful. Dissenters are the people’s enemies. But what a one-dimensional caricature of a people! It is narrowed and intellectually impoverished, renouncing the very imagination, creation, and debate that must drive a culture’s vibrancy. Moreover, it is prone to schism and further narrowing as disagreements emerge internally and the newly disloyal are discarded. The people to which one should aspire ought to treasure, confidently, the vibrancy that comes from diversity of thought and expression.

To be clear, this doesn’t mean that a people should be cherished for a set of abstract principles alone – for elements of their constitutional order that are indistinguishable from any other legally-defined people. Peoples have good reason to cherish the languages in which they have come to express their public and private aspirations, their distinctive traditions of normative debate and discussion, their history of institutional development, their religiously-grounded reflections, their literatures, their musical traditions, their arts. These need not at all be backward-looking; if the cultures are vibrant, the resources are brought to bear on understanding and navigating the society’s current challenges. And they need not be pursued in a manner that constrains thought and expression. On the contrary, languages are the vehicles of our thought and expression, and the continuation of the lines of inquiry that are carried by one’s own particular language can preserve insights that might otherwise be lost, to the impoverishment of all.

Those who believe in an inclusive sense of community have sometimes been so worried by constraining and aggressive forms of nationalism that they have ceded all valuing of culture, all appreciation of national traditions, to those on the right of the political spectrum, taking refuge in a purely constitutional patriotism. That is not the argument made here. In discussion, the collective that contributed to this paper noted that such an abandonment of the field leaves great scope for those who have a much narrower vision of their societies, among them populists, because it fails to provide any forms of public valuing, expression, or debate in relation to such commitments. The vision of the people in this argument, in contrast, recognizes the value of those commitments, in all their diversity and plurality. But it aspires to engage with them confidently, recognizing the value of putting them to work, testing them, debating them, bringing them into conversation with contrasting traditions. It is a dynamic and outward-looking conception of those elements that make up a people.

Second, we need to revitalize and defend the institutions of democracy. This response ought not to be defensive only. It should learn from the alienation that sustains populist movements, inquire into the causes of that alienation, and seek effective responses.

Of course, one dimension does need to be the defence of institutions of democracy against erosion. In my view, the defence must include the protection of the basic right of all citizens to vote, together with measures designed to preserve and vindicate that right: the elimination of exclusions from the franchise; the achievement and maintenance of a definition of citizenship that includes all long-term residents; effective voter registration; vigorous resistance to strategies of voting suppression. It is instructive that each of these elements is under assault by right populists in the world today. Those assaults are another manifestation of populists' strategy of undermining the institutional structures by which people participate in politics in order to further their claim that they alone speak for the people. Few would suggest that the right to vote, all on its own, is sufficient for a vibrant democratic society. Sometimes those who advocate deliberative democracy or direct action have suggested that the right to vote is not worth much. But that, it seems to me, is wrongheaded. If one of the factors that drives populism is the perception of unequal voice, the structural baseline of the equal right to vote, combined with its symbolic prominence, remains crucial. Preserving its integrity sustains the one obvious litmus test, grounded in actual participation, of democratic legitimacy.

But a purely reactive policy of defence is insufficient. The problem is not populist movements' criticisms of institutions. The problem arises when those movements embrace anti-institutionalism in principle: when they squarely commit themselves to the wrecking ball. But often even those populist movements are drawing much of their force from citizens' disaffection from what the citizens' consider to be unresponsive, ineffective, or corrupt institutions. The movements channel profoundly democratic dissatisfaction into forms of protest designed to secure a hearing. It would be a great mistake to dismiss those grievances out of hand. On the contrary, we need to cultivate a spirit of scrutiny, experimentation, assessment, responsiveness, and reform in our institutional arrangements. Indeed, on occasion populist movements – especially movements of the left – are experimenting with their own novel institutional forms. Those experiments might, at the very least, help us to define more accurately and therefore correct more surely the shortcomings of our existing arrangements. At times they might be worth emulating and developing.

Greater exercise of political choice in decentralized forums – at the municipal level, for example – may be one answer, although it cannot be sufficient. Public concern is most acute with respect to matters that have to be addressed by larger political communities: the achievement of greater economic equality, effective responses to the threat of environmental collapse, the protection of health, Indigenous/non-Indigenous reconciliation, addressing economic dislocation both domestically and internationally, the transformation of energy policy. Moreover, one of the key drivers of populism is the perception of neglect for rural areas, which decentralization can address in only limited fashion. I would love to see governments stimulating debate around methods for addressing these challenges. I admire the policies of public deliberation pursued by the Government of Quebec (in its États généraux) and by Scandinavian countries. I am intrigued by the potential of intense policy discussions in microcosm, which are then extended to a broader public (such as Jim Fishkin's deliberative polling).

Such experimentation would, I think, provide broader avenues for political participation and reinforce the realization that strong and responsive institutions are necessary to effective self-government. It would directly counter the populist anti-institutional mythology.

Note that these measures lie largely within the capacity of democratic governments and a democratic citizenry themselves to achieve. They do not require constraints on democratic decision-making established by courts. Indeed, it is difficult to see how courts could engage in the kind of institutional

experimentation contemplated here. Courts have their responsibilities in maintaining the institutional foundations of democratic governance. They can preserve the integrity of the right to vote. They certainly can refrain from decisions that directly undermine that integrity, such as, in the United States, *Citizens United* or *Bush v Gore*. They can also protect the structures – of freedom of speech, of association, of the independence of the judiciary, of academic freedom, of parliamentary procedure, of anti-corruption – on which true democratic participation depends. Those bulwarks matter. But it is a mistake to think the courts on their own can protect our societies from an erosion of democratic practices – that they can protect us from our own democratic selves. The challenges of populism are fundamentally the challenges of democracy. They have to met on that ground.

Silvia Suteu has argued that an enabling factor in the turn to populism in Central and Eastern Europe was the use of methods that were neither participatory nor deliberative to develop the post-Communist constitutions: “They were instead drafted as elite pacts and have remained in many ways far removed from the societies which they govern.”¹¹ As a result, constitutionalists could not rely upon robust defence from the citizenry, whose knowledge of and attachment to the constitution were limited. Democratic constitutionalism has to be sustained by democratic means.

Third, the above analysis also suggests the importance of developing an inclusive democratic ethic through democratic practice.

I do not see how the narrowing of the conception of the people typical of populism can be countered simply by turning the tables, so that those who are currently disfavoured disregard the others in return. The exclusion of segments of the population from equal citizenship is a driver of populism, not its solution. I suggest, then, that those in government continue to attend carefully to segments of the electorate with whom they will never fully agree, whose votes they will never secure, but to whom they remain accountable and from whom they acquire political insight essential to governing the country as a whole. They should exemplify, in other words, an ethic of inclusive citizenship. They, and we as citizens generally, should model by their practice what it means to be a democratic people, forming part of a political community even when we disagree.

To be clear, I am not suggesting a simplistic reliance on what passes for “bipartisanship” in the US political system, which too often connotes an avoidance of hard-edged decisions and the pursuit of a logrolling politics, in which benefits for one are traded off against benefits for another. As will become clear in the next section, I think that decisions that are highly contested are essential. The objective, then, is not to secure unanimous agreement; it is to model respect among those who continue to disagree. That respect may not be reciprocated. In fact, as long as we remain in this era of populist politics we can be pretty certain that it will not be. But what is at stake is our conduct, our imagined political community, not merely that of our opponents.

Fourth, we need to do something serious about economic inequality.

Chantal Mouffe has written of the need to reverse the oligarchization of political decision-making. Although I strongly support the need for greater opportunities for citizen participation, to my mind this formulation runs two risks. First, it may confuse populism’s critique with a diagnosis of populism’s causes. The populist critique certainly declares that government is in the control of an oligarchy, but in large, mass societies, it is difficult to see how most of the citizenry will not, even after reforms, be at one

¹¹ Suteu, [Jean Monnet Working Paper 6/17].

step removed from the final decision-making. I suspect that most citizens realize and accept that conclusion. Second, that formulation may subject reform to an idealized and unattainable standard, that of direct political participation in the *polis*. When I was active in that housing cooperative so many years ago, I remember running across a quotation from the socialist wag, George Bernard Shaw: “Socialism takes too many evenings.” Now, I hasten to add that I remained fully engaged in the housing co-op (I was its president, my spouse and partner its secretary, for all the years we lived as students in Montreal during which the co-op was renovated from top to bottom), but I have some sympathy for my fellow citizens who cannot make such a large commitment (indeed, who often don’t have the freedom from day-to-day needs to make such a choice). We have to avoid an outcome in which the concerns of those who cannot participate are disregarded. This means, I think, that we need to focus not just on the mechanisms of democratic participation but also on the substantive preconditions of democratic legitimacy.

There is one set of foundational commitments that have been systematically neglected in recent decades. Healthy, self-governing polities are buttressed by a rough-and-ready kind of social contract: the sense that citizens will bear a roughly equivalent balance of the benefits and burdens of citizenship. The equality may not be – indeed never is – complete equality of outcomes, but nor is it reducible to the formal equality of the right to vote. There is a fiscal dimension to citizens’ equality: a sense that the burdens and benefits of citizenship ought to be fairly shared. If the burdens and benefits appear to be wildly skewed, trust in political institutions is eroded, and their ability to claim the allegiance of their citizens undermined.

Isn’t that what we see now in the age of populist politics? It is precisely that erosion of trust that is one of the core elements of populism. And isn’t this erosion of trust precisely what ties populist economic grievances to populist politics? We have seen, in each of the societies marked by a rise in populism, a perception that the distribution of economic benefits in society is dramatically skewed. Economic inequality is at levels last seen in the early 20th century. It shows no signs of being reversed. Rural dissatisfaction has also been driven, at least in part, by the prosperity gap between rural areas and cities. Moreover, even if virtually all members of the post-Communist societies are economically better off in absolute terms, the sense of unfairness – of some people scamming the system – is pronounced. It may well be that many of the principal scammers are themselves supporters of the ruling parties. It may also be the case that many populist politicians are doing their best to entrench the causes of and prevent solutions to economic inequality. Witness the Orbán government’s move to constitutionally entrench a low-tax regime. But this is another example of the political benefits to populist politicians of a generalized loss of trust.

This is especially true when many of those who argue against populist leaders leave the question of economic justice unaddressed. The anti-populists are often – not always – champions of economic liberalization. They place their trust in European institutions at a time when those institutions are justifiably under fire for the distributional consequences of austerity in southern Europe. They emphasize, above all, the importance of legality and constitutional form.

A charitable explanation for that failure may be that we now think of constitutions in quintessentially legal terms, and the remediation of economic inequality is something that neither legal declarations nor adjudication by courts can well achieve. Perhaps we have all become constitutional lawyers. But if we do believe in democratic constitutionalism, we should return to a more comprehensive vision of the preconditions of democracy.